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Abs t ract
Thi s paper i nvest i gat es stati sti call y t he exi stence of a long-r un relati onshi p bet w een publ i c
expendi t ure and G N P (W agner’ s L aw ) usi ng dat a for Tur key over the peri od 1950-1990.   R ecent
advances  i n  t i me   seri es analysi s have  permi t t ed t he  i nvest i gat i on  of  t he  l ong-r un  r elati onshi p  bet w een
publ i c expendi t ure and G N P in t erms  o f  coint egrati on analysi s.  In t he case of W agner’ s L aw ,
evidence of  coint egrati on i s suff i cient  t o establi sh a l ong-r un r elati onshi p bet w een publ i c expendi t ure
and i ncom e.     Ho we v e r ,   t o support   W agner’ s Law  w oul d r equi r e uni di r ecti onal   causali t y f r om  i ncom e
t o publ i c expendi t ure.    Ther efore coint egrati on shoul d be seen as a necessary condi t i on f or  W agner’ s
Law,  but  not  suff i cient.   H ence, condi t i onal  on coi nt egrati on result s, it  is necessary t o l ook at  the
causali t y propert i es of the m odel ( s).   U sing t he Engl e and G ranger coint egrati on t est,  the G ranger
Ca us a l i t y t est  and Tur ki sh t i me   seri es aggregate dat a f or  t he peri od 1950-1990,   we   f i nd no em pir i cal
support   f or  W agner’ s Law.
K eyw ords: W agner' s Law,   Publ i c Expendi t ure Gr ow t h,   Un i t   Root   Tes t ,
Coi nt egrati on  An a l ysi s,  Ca us a l i t y.2
Co i nt egrati on  Ana l ysi s-Ca us a l i t y  Te s t i ng  and  W agner’s Law:
The   Ca s e   of  T urkey,  1950-1990
1I n t roduct i on
On e   of  t he  ma i n  f eatures of  t he  cont em porary  wo r l d  has  been t he  cont i nued  grow t h  i n
t he relati ve si ze of the publ i c sector in bot h devel opi ng and devel oped count r i es.  In
part i cular,   aft er  t he  Second  Wo r l d  Wa r ,   t he  phenom enon  of  publ i c expendi t ure grow t h
happened al mo s t  uni versall y and regardl ess of the nat ure of eit her the pol i t i cal or
econom i c system  concerned.     Thus,   t he grow t h of  publ i c expendi t ure as a proport i on
of GNP ( or GDP)  has received consi derable att enti on fr om  econom i sts, w ho have
ma i nl y di r ected t hei r   att enti on t o t he analysi s of  t he r easons f or  t he perm anent   grow t h
of  publ i c expendi t ure.
Tur key appears to fol l ow  t hi s uni versall y observed “rul e” of perm anent  grow t h of
publ i c expendit ure.  D uri ng t he peri od bet w een 1950 and 1990,  econom i c grow t h,
social and pol i t i cal changes w ere accom panied by a sharp i ncrease in governm ent
spendi ng.     For   exam ple,  wh i l e t he r ati o of  t ot al  publ i c expendi t ure t o GNP  wa s   23. 5
percent in 1950,  thi s rati o doubl ed in j ust  fort y years, increasing t o 42. 0 percent in
1990.
For   a l ong t i me ,   t here wa s   no m odel   of  t he det ermi nat i on of  publ i c expendi t ures.    Of
course, som e classical econom i sts, e.g.  Ad a m Smi t h,  pai d at t enti on t o t endenci es in
t he l ong-t erm  t r end i n publ i c expendi t ures,  but   t here wa s   no att em pt  t o t r anslate such
observat i ons i nt o a general theory (Tar schys,  1975).   Ho we v e r ,  over one hundred
years ago,   a simp l e m odel   of  t he det ermi nat i on of  publ i c expendi t ures wa s   off ered by
A dol ph W agner,  a leading G erm an econom i st of t he t i me .   On t he basi s of hi s
em pir i cal fi ndi ngs,  he “formu l ated a ‘l aw ’ of expandi ng st ate expendi t ures; wh i ch
poi nt ed to t he grow i ng i m port ance of governm ent  acti vi t y and expendi t ure as an
i nevi t able f eature of  ‘ progressive state’” ( Bi r d,   1971:   1).     He   wa s   t he f i r st  schol ar  t o
r ecogni se the exi stence of a posi t i ve corr elati on bet w een the l evel of econom i c
devel opm ent   and  t he  size of  t he  publ i c sector.
Ther e are several m odel s to expl ain publ i c expendi t ure grow t h.   T he oldest  and t he
mo s t   cit ed one i s W agner’ s Law.     The  aim  of  t hi s paper  i s t o i nvest i gat e wh e t her  t he
Tur ki sh case support s W agner’ s L aw  or not .   There are at least two  r easons for
i nvest i gat i ng  t he  val i di t y  of  W agner’ s Law  i n  t he  Tur ki sh case.    Fi r st,   we   can eli mi nat e
earl i er  studi es’  me t hodol ogi cal  short com ings i n t erms   of  W agner’ s Law.     Second,   we
att em pt t o reach som e insi ght s in order t o devel op bet t er t heori es of publ i c
expendi t ure grow t h  i n  t he  case of  Tur key.3
We  w i l l  now  bri efl y out l i ne t he st r uct ure of the paper.   The paper is organi sed as
f ol l ow s:     I n  secti on  2,   we   wi l l   bri efl y  l ook  at  W agner’ s Law.     I n  secti on  3,   we   wi l l   very
bri efl y  me n t i on  our  dat a.    I n  secti on  4,   we   wi l l   di scuss our  me t hodol ogy.     That   i s,  f i r st,
we   wi l l   l ook at  t i me   seri es propert i es of  t he vari ables,  nam el y,   t he i nt egrati on l evel  of
t he  vari ables.    Then,   we   wi l l   aappl y  a coint egrati on  analysi s f or  six  version  of  W agner' s
Law.   Foll ow i ng t hi s, condi t i onal  on our coint egrati on result s, we  wi l l  di scuss and
appl y causali t y t est for six versions of W agner' s L aw .  Final l y,  in secti on 5,  we  wi l l
provi de  a s u mma r y  and  som e general  concl usi ons.
2 W agner’s Law
W agner (1883),  wr i t i ng m ore than one hundred years ago,  off ered a m odel of the
det ermi nat i on of  publ i c expendi t ure i n wh i ch publ i c expendi t ure grow t h wa s   a nat ural
consequence of  econom i c grow t h.     Lat er,   hi s vi ew s we r e f ormu l ated as a l aw  and are
oft en r eferr ed t o as “W agner’ s Law”.     Hi s ma i n cont r i but i on i n t hi s f i eld wa s   t hat   he
t r i ed t o establi sh generali sati ons about   publ i c expendi t ures,  not   f r om  post ul ates about
t he  l ogi c of  choi ce,  but   r ather  by  di r ect  i nference f r om   hi stori cal  evidence.
Af t er  t he  publ i cati on  of  Engl i sh t r anslati ons  of  W agner' s wo r ks  i n  1958,   W agner' s Law
has becom e very popul ar in academ ic cir cles and it  has been analysed and t ested by
m any researchers, for exam ple, Mu s g r ave (1969),  Bi r d (1971),  Kr zyzaniak (1972,
1974),  Ö nder (1974),  M ann (1980),  Sahni  and Si ngh (1984),  Ab i zadeh and G ray
( 1985),   Ra m  ( 1986,   1987),   Ya l çin ( 1987),   He n r ekson ( 1992),   Courakis et  al.   ( 1993),
Mu r t hy (1993),  Ox l ey (1994) An s a r i  et al.  (1997) and Chl etsos and K oll i as (1997).
Som e of  these researchers have appl i ed tr adit i onal  regression analysi s, wh i l st som e
ot hers have used causal i t y t esti ng,  and m ore recentl y coi nt egrati on analysi s has
appeared i n t he l i t erature.    Empi r i cal  t ests of  W agner’ s Law  have yi elded r esult s t hat
di f f er  consi derably  f r om   count r y  t o  count r y  and  peri od  t o  peri od.
W agner’ s L aw  states that  publ i c expendi t ure increases at a faster rate than t hat  of
nat i onal   out put .     I n ot her  wo r ds,   “as per  capit a i ncom e r i ses i n i ndust r i ali sing nat i ons,
t hei r  publ i c sectors w il l  grow  i n relati ve i m port ance” (Bi r d,  1971:  2).   T here are at
l east six versions of thi s law  (see Table 1) wh i ch have been em pir i call y i nvest i gat ed.
As  He n r ekson (1992) poi nt s out ,  a test of W agner' s Law  shoul d focus on t he t i me -
seri es behavi our of publ i c expendi t ure in a count r y for as long a t i me  p e r i od as
possibl e, r ather t han on a cross-secti on of count r i es at di f f erent i ncom e l evels.
Ther efore, i n t hi s paper we  wi l l  exam ine w het her t here is a long-r un relati onshi p
bet w een publ i c expendi t ure and  GNP,   along  t he  l i nes  suggest ed by  W agner’ s Law,   f or
t he case of Tur key.   R ecent advances i n t i me  s e r i es analysi s have permi t t ed the
i nvest i gat i on of t he l ong-r un relati onshi p bet w een publ i c expendi t ure and G N P in4
t erms   of  coint egrati on analysi s,  err or- corr ecti on m echanism  and causali t y t esti ng.     As
me n t i oned above,   t here are at  l east  six version of  W agner’ s Law.     Ho we v e r ,   t here i s
no obj ecti ve cri t eri on t o decide wh i ch of  t he six versions i s t he mo s t   appropri ate and
convi nci ng t est  of  t he Law.     So,   we   wi l l   need t o consi der  and t est  all   six versions of
W agner' s L aw  in t he peri od fr om  1950 t o 1990.   A ll  the equat i ons i n Tabl e 1 have
been esti ma t ed in t erms  o f  const ant ( 1968) Tur ki sh L ir as and are specif i ed in
l ogari t hm i c form,  so that  it  wi l l  be possi bl e to obt ain m easures of incom e el asti cit y
di r ectl y.     The  sym bol   L,   before a vari able denot es i t s nat ural  l ogari t hm .
Tabl e 1: Si x  Ve r sions  of  W agner’ s Law
Funct i onal   f orm V ersion
1 LE  =  a +  bLG N P Peacock-Wi sem an [ 1968]
2L C   =  a +b LGNP Pr yor  [ 1969]
3 LE  =  a +  bL(GNP/ P) Gof f ma n   [ 1968]
4L ( E/ GNP)   =  a +bL( GNP/ P)M usgr ave [ 1969]
5L ( E/ P)   =  a +  bL(GNP/ P) G upt a [ 1967]
6L ( E/ GNP)   =  a +b LGNP " Mo d i f i ed" version  of  P- W  suggest ed by  M ann  [ 1980]
Ear l i er  studi es of  t he grow t h of  publ i c expendi t ure have not   l ooked at  t he t i me   seri es
propert i es of  t he vari ables exam ined.     Ther e wa s   an i mp l i cit   assum pti on t hat   t he dat a
we r e stati onary.     Ho we v e r ,   r ecent  devel opm ent s i n  t i me   seri es analysi s show   t hat   mo s t
m acroeconom i c ti me  s e r i es have a uni t  root  (a stochast i c tr end) and t hi s propert y i s
descri bed as di f f erence stati onari t y,  so that  t he fi r st di f f erence of a ti me  s e r i es is
stati onary (Ne l son and Pl osser,  1982).   So t hat ,  i n t esti ng W agner’ s L aw , t he
nonst ati onary  propert y  of  t he  seri es mu s t   be  consi dered f i r st.     I f   bot h  seri es are I ( 1),   i t
i s necessary  t o  perf orm  coint egrati on  t ests.    I f   a pai r   of  I ( 1)  vari ables are coint egrated,
one  t hen  proceeds t o  bui l d  an err or  corr ecti on  m odel   i n  order  t o  capture t he  short - r un
and l ong-r un causal  r elati onshi p bet w een t he t wo   seri es. A s we   me n t i oned above,   t o
eli mi nat e earl y st udi es’ me t hodol ogi cal short com ings,  coint egrati on analysi s w il l  be
appl i ed i n  t hi s study.
Ther e have been also som e em pir i cal studi es relati ng t o W agner' s L aw  for Tur key.
Kr zyzaniak (1974) conduct ed a study of Tur key for the peri od fr om  1950 t o 1969.
Af t er  r egressing publ i c expendi t ure on GNP  he f ound stati sti call y signi f i cant  esti ma t es
of the i ncom e el asti cit y of publ i c expendi t ure w it h regard t o  GNP wh i ch appear to
support  W agner’ s L aw .  Ö nder ( 1974) conduct ed a study of publ i c expendi t ure
grow t h  i n  Tur key  f or  t he  peri od  1947-1967.     Us i ng  aggregate vari ables ( i n  t ot al  and  i n5
per  capit a t erms ) ,   he f ound t he i ncom e elasti cit y of  publ i c expendi t ure wi t h r egard t o
GNP  ( or  GNP  per  capit a)  t o  be  sm all er  t han  uni t y.     These r esult s appear  t o  undermi ne
W agner’ s L aw  (wi t h aggregate data) for the st udy peri od.   In a recent study,  Ya l çin
( 1987)  also f ound t hat   usi ng aggregate dat a,  her  f i ndi ngs di d not   support   t he val i di t y
of  W agner’ s Law.
Al t hough t here are som e studi es of publ i c expendi t ure grow t h i n t he Turki sh publ i c
f i nance l i t erature, as m enti oned above,  to best  of our know l edge,  none have appl i ed
m odern econom et r i c techni ques.   Thus,  our cont r i but i on t o t he l i t erature on t he
grow t h of publ i c expendi t ure in t erms  o f  W agner' s L aw  in Turkey w i l l  be t o appl y
r ecent  econom et r i c t echni ques  wh i ch i nvest i gat e t i me   seri es propert i es of  t he  vari ables,
use coint egrati on analysi s, and exam ine t he causal r elati onshi p bet w een nati onal
i ncom e  and  publ i c expendi t ure.
I n t hi s paper,   1950 wi l l   be t aken as t he start i ng poi nt .     Ther e are several  r easons f or
t he choi ce of thi s year,  since it  wa s  a  t urni ng poi nt  in Turkey' s pol i t i co-econom i c
hi story.     Fi r stl y,   t here had been a singl e part y system  since 1923,   but   i n 1950 a mu l t i -
part y system  w as establi shed.  This new  phenom enon aff ected not  onl y pol i t i cs but
also the econom y and publ i c expendi t ure grow t h.   In t hi s new  era, vot ers’ dem ands
we r e t aken i nt o  account . 1    Secondl y,   by 1950,   Tur key had r ecovered t o a l arge extent
f r om  t he abnorma l i t i es of t he Second W orl d W ar.   Fi nal l y,  as indi cated by som e
r esearchers (e.g. ,  Kr zyzaniak (1974),  and K rueger ( 1974)) ,  t he avail abil i t y and
r eli abil i t y  of  dat a i s poor  before 1950  i n  t he  Tur ki sh case.
3D a t a
The dat a under exam inat i on consi st of gross nati onal  product  (GNP) ,  tot al publ i c
expendi t ure ( E) ,   and publ i c consum pt i on expendi t ure ( C) ,   all   i n r eal  t erms .     The  GNP
defl ator  has been used t o obt ain r eal  val ues.     The  dat a are also exam ined i n per  capit a
t erms ,  and som e categori es of publ i c expendi t ure are used in t he form o f  rati os t o
GNP,  as requi r ed by t he vari ous formu l ati ons of W agner' s L aw .  T he defi ni t i ons of
dat a and  t hei r   sources are i n  A ppendi x.
1  A ccordi ng t o Bi r d ( 1970),   one of  t he necessary condi t i ons f or  t he operati on of  W agner’ s Law  i s ( at
l east  i mp l i cit l y)  dem ocrati sati on  ( i n  t he  sense of  pol i t i cal  part i cipat i on)  of  t he  pol i t y.6
4T h e   Me t hodol ogy:  Co i nt egrati on  Ana l ysi s and  Ca us a l i t y  Te s t i ng
4. 1T e s t i ng  For  Co i nt egrati on
4. 1. 1T h e   C oncept  of  Co i nt egrati on
The  concept  of  coint egrati on,   f i r st  i nt r oduced i nt o t he l i t erature by Gr anger  ( 1981),   i s
r elevant  t o t he probl em  of  t he det ermi nat i on of  l ong-r un or  ' equil i bri um '   r elati onshi ps
i n  econom i cs.    Coi nt egrati on  i s t he  stati sti cal  i mp l i cati on  of  t he  existence of  a l ong-r un
r elati onshi p bet w een econom i c vari ables (Thom as,  1993).   In ot her wo r ds,  fr om  a
stati sti cal poi nt  of vi ew , a long-t erm r elati onshi p m eans that  t he vari ables m ove
t oget her over ti me  s o  t hat  short - t erm d i sturbances fr om  t he l ong-t erm t r end w i l l  be
corr ected (M anni ng and A ndri anacos, 1993).   T he basic idea behi nd coi nt egrati on i s
t hat  if ,  in t he l ong-r un,  two  o r  mo r e seri es m ove closel y t oget her,  even though t he
seri es t hem sel ves are t r ended,   t he di f f erence bet w een t hem  i s const ant.     I t   i s possibl e
t o r egard t hese seri es as defi ni ng a l ong-r un equi l i bri um  r elati onshi p,   as t he di f f erence
bet w een t hem  i s stati onary ( Ha l l   and He n r y,   1989).     A  l ack of  coint egrati on suggest s
t hat  such vari ables have no l ong-r un relati onshi p:  i n pri nci pal  t hey can w ander
arbi t r ari l y  f ar  aw ay f r om   each ot her  ( Di ckey et.   al. ,   1991).
I n f act,   m any earl y r esearchers w ho l ooked at  W agner’ s Law  i gnored t he stati onari t y
r equi r em ent  of  t he vari ables.    Ho we v e r ,   t he standard r egression t echni ques are i nval i d
wh e n   appl i ed t o  non-stati onary  vari ables.    I n  ot her  wo r ds,   “.. . stati c r egressions  am ong
i nt egrated seri es are m eaningful  if  and onl y i f  they i nvol ve coi nt egrated vari ables”
( Ba ne r j ee,  et  all .   1993:   204).     Thi s practi ce l ed t o a subst anti al  l i t erature deali ng wi t h
t he  spuri ous  r egression  probl em .
4. 1. 2T i me   Series Properti es of  t he  Series:  St ati onari t y  and  Uni t   R oot  Te s t s
The  i nvest i gat i on of  stati onari t y ( or  nonst ati onari t y)  i n a t i me   seri es i s closel y r elated
t o t he t ests f or  uni t   r oot s.    Exi stence of  uni t   r oot s i n a seri es denot es non-stati onari t y.
A  num ber  of  alt ernat i ve  t ests are avail able f or  t esti ng  wh e t her  a seri es i s stati onary.
Test i ng  f or  t he  Or d e r   of   I nt egrati on
I n  order  t o  establi sh t he  order  of  i nt egrati on  of  t he  vari ables i n  our  dat a set,   we   em ploy
DF a n d  ADF t ests.  Th e  ADF t est for uni t  root s (Di ckey and Full er,  1979;  1981)
i ndi cates w hether an indi vi dual  seri es, say yt,  i s stati onary by runni ng an O LS
r egression.     Al l   t hese  t ests are based  on  r egression  equat i ons  1  and  2  presented bel ow .
The  general  f orm  of  ADF  t est  can be  wr i t t en as f ol l ow s:7
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∑  yt− i + d + g  t+ e 
t ( f or  f i r st  di f f erences) (2)
wh e r e ∆ y are t he f i r st  di f f erences of  t he seri es,  mi s t he num ber  of  l ags and t   i s t i me .
“The practi cal rul e for establi shing t he val ue of [m]  .. .  is that  it  shoul d be relati vel y
sm all  in order to save degrees of fr eedom ,  but  large enough not  to al l ow  for the
existence of autocorr elati on i n e 
t.   For exam ple, i f  for [m] =2 t he D urbi n-Wa t son
autocorr elati on st ati sti c is low ,  i ndi cati ng fi r st order autocorr elati on,  i t  w oul d be
sensibl e to i ncrease m  w it h t he hope t hat  such autocorr elati on w i l l  di sappear”
( Cha r em za and  D eadm an,  1992:   135).
I n short ,  t he D F/ ADF t est proceeds as fol l ow s:  equat i ons such as 1 and 2 are
esti ma t ed adding as m any t erms  o f  di f f erenced vari ables as are necessary t o achieve
r esidual s t hat   are non-autocorr elated.    Al t hough we   have i ncl uded t r end i n l evels,  but
we   exclude  i t   i n  f i r st  di f f erences.
Tabl es 2a-c present the calculated t- val ues fr om  D F/ ADF  t ests on each vari able in
l evels and  i n  f i r st  di f f erences.    I n  t he  case of  t he  l evels of  t he  seri es,  t he  nul l   hypot hesi s
of  non-stati onari t y  cannot   be  r ejected f or  any  of  t he  seri es.    Ther efore,  t he  l evels of  all
seri es are non-stati onary.
Tabl e 2a A D F  Uni t   R oot  Te s t   i n  Le ve l s ( ADF  R egression  wi t h  an 
Intercept)
Va r i abl e s ADF  ( 0 ) ADF  ( 1 ) ADF  ( 2 ) ADF  ( 3)
LGNP −15853 .
ASH −11747 . - 0. 8178 -0. 3665
LE 01102 .
SH 01522 .
A 0. 4494 0. 3998
LC 01627 .
S 02785 .
AH 0. 6744 0. 5855
L( GNP/ P) −13406 .
ASH - 0. 9490 -0. 5854 -0. 713
L( E/ P) −00727 .
SH 00777 .
A 0. 3731 0. 2741
L( E/ GNP) −12207 .
ASH - 0. 5429 -0. 2740 -0. 4646
5%   CV - 2. 9358 -2. 9378 -2. 9400 -2. 9422
Not es:  ADF  t est  stati sti cs are com put ed usi ng  r egressions  wi t h  an i nt ercept  and  m  l agged  f i r st-
di f f erences of the dependent  vari able (m=0 , . . . , 3).   The superscri pt s, A,  S and H  i ndi cate the
choi ce of t he A kai ke Informa t i on,  t he Schw arz B ayesian and the H annan-Qu i nn cri t eri a
r especti vel y.     Cr i t i cal  val ues  t aken f r om   M acK innon  ( 1991)  and  r eport ed by  MF I T  4. 0.8
Tabl e 2 b ADF  Uni t   R oot  Te s t s i n  Le ve l s ( ADF  R egression  wi t h  an 
Intercept  and  a  Li near  Trend)
Va r i abl e s ADF  ( 0 ) ADF  ( 1 ) ADF  ( 2 ) ADF  ( 3)
LGNP −2 0965 .
ASH - 1. 7185 -1. 5974 -1. 2817
LE −32838 .
ASH - 2. 5815 -2. 6798 -3. 3552
LC −34781 .
ASH - 2. 6133 -2. 5331 -3. 3006
L( GNP/ P) −21401 .
ASH - 1. 7927 -1. 8116 -1. 7424
L( E/ P) −32558 .
ASH - 2. 5369 -2. 6885 -3. 4636
L( E/ GNP) −33791 .
ASH - 2. 3392 -2. 35. 2- 2. 6299
5%   CV - 3. 5247 -3. 5279 -3. 5313 -3. 5348
Not es:  ADF  t est  stati sti cs are com put ed usi ng r egressions wi t h an i nt ercept,   a l i near  t r end and
m  l agged f i r st- di f f erences of  t he dependent   vari able ( m=0 , . . . , 3).     The  superscri pt s,  A,   S  and H
i ndi cate the choi ce of the A kai ke Informa t i on,  the Schw arz B ayesian and the H annan-Qu i nn
cri t eri a respecti vel y.   C ri t i cal val ues t aken fr om  M acK innon (1991) and report ed by M FIT
4. 0.
Tabl e 2c ADF  Un i t   Root   Test   i n  Fi rst  Di f f erences
( ADF  R egression  wi t h  an  I nt ercept)
Va r i abl e s ADF  ( 0 ) ADF  ( 1 ) ADF  ( 2 ) ADF  ( 3)
LGNP −62850 .
ASH - 4. 3437 -4. 4027 -2. 6828
LE −80195 .
ASH - 4. 9923 -3. 4482 -3. 1571
LC −82546 .
ASH - 5. 5696 -3. 5334 -3. 0633
L( GNP/ P) −65086 .
ASH - 4. 3463 -4. 3384 -2. 7263
L( E/ P) −79994 .
ASH - 4. 9759 -3. 3934 -3. 1230
L( E/ GNP) −83913 .
ASH - 5. 2148 -3. 74183 -3. 0088
5%   CV - 2. 9378 -2. 9400 -2. 9422 -2. 9446
Not es: ADF t est stati sti cs are com puted using regressions w i t h an i nt ercept and m  l agged fi r st-
di f f erences of  t he  dependent   vari able ( m= 0 , . . . , 3).     The  superscri pt s,  A,   S  and  H  i ndi cate t he  choi ce of
t he Ak a i ke I nforma t i on,   t he Schwar z Ba ye s i an and t he H annan-Qu i nn cri t eri a r especti vel y.     Cr i t i cal
val ues  t aken f r om   M acK innon  ( 1991)  and  r eport ed by  MF I T  4. 0.9
A ppl yi ng t he sam e t ests t o f i r st  di f f erences t o det ermi ne t he order  of  i nt egrati on,   t he
cri t i cal val ue i s (are) less (i n absol ut e terms )  than t he calculated values of the t est
stati sti c for all  seri es in al l  cases.  T his show s that  all  of the seri es are int egrated of
order  one  [ I ( 1)] ,   and  becom e stati onary  aft er  di f f erencing  once.    Si nce all   of  t he  seri es
are i nt egrated of  t he sam e order,   t he seri es ma y   be t ested f or  t he existence of  a l ong-
r un  r elati onshi p  bet w een t hem ,   i . e.  a coint egrati ng  r elati onshi p.
I n sum ,  the evi dence suggest s stati onary seri es in fi r st di f f erences, so w e can apply
coint egrati on  analysi s t o  our  dat a set.
4. 1. 3E m p i rical  Re s ul t s of  Co i nt egrati on  Te s t s
A c o i nt egrati on t est can be appl i ed to det ermi ne t he exi stence of a long-r un
r elati onshi p  bet w een t he  vari ables.    The  Engl e and  Gr anger  ( 1987)  t wo   step procedure
f or  m odel l i ng  t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een coint egrated vari ables has  r eceived  a great  deal
of  att enti on i n r ecent  years.    On e   of  t he benefi t s of  t hi s approach i s t hat   t he l ong-r un
equi l i bri um  r elati onshi p can be m odel l ed by a str aight f orwa r d r egression i nvol vi ng t he
l evels of  t he vari ables ( I nder,   1993).     A ccordi ng t o Ho l den and Thom son ( 1992:   26),
“thi s approach i s att r acti ve  f or  t wo   r easons:  Fi r st,   i t   r educes t he  num ber  of  coeff i cients
t o  be  esti ma t ed and  so,  r educes t he  probl em  of  mu l t i coll i neari t y  [ Of   course,  t hi s i s not
a probl em  w it h our m odel ( s)] .   Second,  the fi r st step can be esti ma t ed by ordi nary
l east  squares.”
Be f ore t esti ng  f or  coint egrati on,   t hat   i s,  i n  order  t o  establi sh t he  existence or  ot herwi se
of a long-r un relati onshi p bet w een tw o econom i c ti me  s e r i es, say x and y, it  is fi r st
necessary t o t est wh e t her vari ables are int egrated to t he sam e order.   A ppl yi ng
DF/ ADF  uni t   r oot   t ests ( Tabl es 2a-2c),   we   f ound t hat   each of  t he vari ables used i n all
six  versions  of  W agner’ s Law  i s I ( 1).     Si nce all   seri es are i nt egrated of  t he  sam e order,
t he seri es can be t ested f or  t he existence of  a l ong-r un r elati onshi p bet w een t hem ,   i . e.
coint egrati on.   The pr ocedure used to est abli sh the exi stence of a coint egrati ng
r elati onshi p i s as fol l ow s:  Fi r st,  t he hypot hesi sed long-r un relati onshi p(s) ( e.g.
l ya b l xe tt t =+ +)  i s (are) esti ma t ed by O LS.   Thi s is call ed the coi nt egrati ng
r egression.   Second,  the residual s fr om  t hi s regression are retained and t he D F/ ADF
t est  i s appl i ed t o  t he  r esidual s,  as f ol l ow s:
∆ e t = f 





∑  ∆ et− i+ vt ( 3)
and t est  H 0: f 
* = 0 against   H 1: f 
*
< 0  us i ng appropri ate cri t i cal val ues (e.g. ,
M acK innon,   1990,   1991).     I n  ot her  wo r ds,   t he  nul l   hypot hesi s of  t he  coint egrati on  t est10
i s that  the seri es form ed by t he residual s of each coint egrati ng regressions are not
stati onary.   It  is necessary t o em phasi se that  the above equat i on has no i nt ercept or
t i me  t r end,  since the e 
ts m ust have a zero m ean because w e do not expect them  t o
have  a det ermi ni sti c t r end.     The  t ests r esult s can be  seen i n  Tabl e 3  bel ow :
Tabl e 3C o i nt egrati on  Re gr essions  and  DF/ ADF  Tes t s
V ersion  of Dependent Coef f i cient  of C ri t i cal  Va l ues
W agner' s L. Var i abl eC o n s t ant Expl anatory  V. R
2
CRDW ADF    ( *) **
1L E - 4. 06 1. 23 0. 975 0. 93 -3. 44    ( 0) -3. 4925
2L C - 4. 70 1. 27 0. 966 0. 93 -3. 66  ( 0) -3. 4925
3L E - 7. 88 2. 25 0. 967 0. 80 -3. 09    ( 0) -3. 4925
4L ( E/ GNP) - 4. 74 0. 41 0. 556 0. 91 -3. 38    ( 0) -3. 4925
5L ( E/ P) - 4. 75 1. 42 0. 936 0. 91 -3. 37    ( 0) -3. 4925
6L ( E/ GNP) - 4. 06 0. 23 0. 573 0. 92 -3. 44    ( 0) -3. 4925
*N um ber  of  l ags ( i n  parentheses)  we r e chosen  by  t he  Ak a i ke  I nforma t i on  Cr i t eri on.
**  Cr i t i cal  val ues  ( at  5%   signi f i cance l evel)   t aken f r om   M acK innon  ( 1991)  and  r eport ed by  MF I T  3. 0.
Be f ore int erpreti ng t he coi nt egrati on result s, i t  i s necessary t o em phasi se that  t he
Engl e-Gr anger  me t hod  does  not   prove  wh e t her  t he  r elati on(s)  i s ( are)  r eall y  a l ong  r un
one(s).     Thi s i s an assum pti on and cannot   be stati sti call y veri f i ed.    We   need t o have a
str ong bel i ef i n a l ong run equi l i bri um  relati onshi p bet w een the vari ables that  i s
support ed by relevant econom i c theory w here the t heory suggest s a suit able
assum pti on  about   a l ong  r un  r elati onshi p  ( Cha r em za and  D eadm an,  1992).
The  nul l   hypot hesi s of  t he coint egrati on t est  i s t hat   t he seri es f orme d   by t he r esidual s
of  each of  t he coint egrati ng r egressions i s not   stati onary.     To  t est  t he nul l   hypot hesi s
of non-stati onari t y of the residual s, the D F/ ADF u n i t  root  tests are em ployed on t he
r esidual s of  each of  t he six coint egrati ng r egressions.     Tabl e 3 presents t he r esult s of
t he D F/ ADF u n i t - r oot  t ests for t he residual s seri es fr om  t he si x coi nt egrati ng
‘ W agner’ s Law’   r egressions.     We   cannot   r eject  t he nul l   hypot hesi s of  nonst ati onari t y
f or fi ve out  of six versions of W agner’ s L aw .  The 5%  cri t i cal val ues (M acK innon,
1991)  are bi gger  ( i n absolut e t erms )   t han t he calculated t - val ues.     The  nul l   hypot hesi s
of non-stati onari t y can be rejected in version 2 onl y (Pr yor’ s version.   If  we  u s e
Cha r em za and D eadm an’s cri t i cal val ues w hi ch are -3. 92 (l ow er l i mi t )  and -3. 80
( upper  l i mi t ) ,   we   f ail ed t o  r eject  t he  nul l   hypot hesi s i n  version  2  as we l l .  These  r esult s
show  t hat  there is no l ong-r un relati onshi p bet w een publ i c expendi t ure and G N P in
Tur key  f or  all   six  versions  of  W agner’ s Law.11
Engl e and Gr anger  ( 1991:   14)  argued t hat   “.. . wh e n   t esti ng non-coint egrati on of  seri es
wh i ch have a dri f t ,   one can i ncl ude a t i me   t r end i n t he coint egrati ng r egression wh i ch
i s equi val ent to det r endi ng t he seri es fi r st.   The cri t i cal val ues i s then even hi gher”.
Fol l ow i ng t hi s,  we   have added a t i me   t r end i nt o coint egrati on r egressions.     Ho we v e r ,
t he  r esult s di d  not   r eject  t he  nul l   hypot hesi s of  non-coint egrati on.
The  r eal  i ncom e elasti cit i es f or  non-r ati o versions are all   greater  t han uni t y,   wh i l e f or
r ati o versions t hey are greater  t han zero.     These r esult s i mp l y t hat   all   versions support
W agner’ s L aw .  Ho we v e r ,  since the vari ables are not  coint egrated in 5 out  of six
versions  of  W agner’ s Law,   t hese  r esult s shoul d  be  r egarded  as unreli able and  based  on
spuri ous regression result s.  Therefore, a regression speci f i ed in t he l evels of t he
vari able wi l l   l ead t o  i nconsi stent  esti ma t es.
Al t hough,  our fi ndi ngs,  fail  to reject the nul l  hypot hesi s of no l ong-r un relati onshi p
bet w een the vari ables, w e have t o t r eat t hese result s w it h cauti on.   W e need t o
consi der  t he  w eaknesses and  l i mi t ati ons  of  coint egrati on  analysi s.    The  f i ndi ngs  of  non-
coint egrati on do not  exclude t he possi bi l i t y of coint egrati on i n som e hi gher order
system  that  incl udes m ore vari ables such as relati ve pri ces, dem ographi c vari ables ,
dependency rati o,  m anufacturi ng rati o,  agri cult ural rati o.   In ot her study,  we  wi l l
exam ine som e of these vari ables.  T he om ission of im port ant vari ables m ay produce
t he non-coint egrati on r esult .     As   M uscatell i   and Hu r n ( 1992:   12)  poi nt ed out ,   “.. .   t he
om i ssion or i ncl usi on of cert ain vari ables fr om  t he coi nt egrati on regression can
dram ati call y  aff ect  t he  r esult s obt ained  f r om   coint egrati ng  r egressions. ”
Ou r  inabi l i t y t o observe a l ong-r un relati onshi p bet w een the publ i c expendi t ure and
G N P m ay be t he result  of a num ber of factors and not  necessari l y a rejecti on of the
existence of  a coint egrated system .    The  Di ckey-Ful l er  procedure used i n t esti ng ma y
not  have suff i cient pow er against  the al t ernat i ve hypot hesi s to al l ow  m easurem ent of
t he l ong-r un relati onshi p.   A ccordi ng t o Bl angi ew icz and C harem za (1990:  314),
“.. . very l i t t l e is know n about  pow er of coint egrati on t ests for sm all  sam ples”.
Ther efore,  stati c OLS  coint egrati ng r egression r esult s ma y   produce i m port ant  bi as i n
sm all   sam ples ( Ba ne r j ee et  al . ,   1986;   Per ma n ,   1991). 2    I n  ot her  wo r ds,   t he  dat a peri od
analysed m ay not  be suff i cientl y l ong t o ful l y capture the l ong-r un relati onshi p.
Al t hough our  stati sti cal  procedure m easures no l ong-r un r elati onshi p we   suspect  t hat
2 In t hi s issue, w e can also quot e K ennedy’s (1998:  267) statem ent:  “The pow er of uni t  root  tests
depends  mu c h   mo r e on  t he  span of  t he  dat a,  ceteris pari bus,   t han  on  t he  num ber  of  observat i ons;   i . e.,
f or m acroeconom i c data w here long busi ness cycles are of im port ance, a long span of annual  dat a
w oul d be preferr ed to a short er span w it h,  say, m ont hl y dat a, even though t he l att er case m ay have
mo r e observat i ons”    ( K ennedy,   1998:   267).12
t hi s result  shoul d be i nt erpreted cauti ousl y.   Ho we v e r ,  wi t hout  evidence of
coint egrati on an err or corr ecti on procedure to m odel  short - r un dynam i cs cannot  be
used.   Ho we v e r ,  i t  i s possibl e to cont i nue t o m odel  t he short - t erm  dynam i cs by
appl yi ng G ranger causali t y t est to m easure for possibl e causal relati onshi ps bet w een
vari ables (An s a r i  et al. ,  1997).   In t he fol l ow i ng sect i on,  we  wi l l  appl y G ranger
causali t y  t est.
4. 2C a u s a l i t y  Be t w een Publ i c Expendi t ure and  Na t i onal   Incom e and  W agner’s Law
As  Ka r avit i s (1987) has argued,  the necessi t y of causali t y t ests in t he fi eld of publ i c
expendi t ure grow t h can be consi dered by usi ng W agner' s l aw  as an exam ple.    De s p i t e
i t s several  i nt erpretati ons,   t he ori gi nal   f ormu l ati on of  W agner' s Law  appears t o i mp l y
t hat  in t he w ake of econom i c devel opm ent ,  governm ent  expendi t ure increases not
me r ely i n si ze but also as percentage of nat i onal  incom e.   The causali t y i n W agner' s
Law r uns fr om  nat i onal  incom e t o publ i c expendi t ure.  In ot her wo r ds,  support  for
W agner’ s L aw  requi r es uni di r ecti onal  causali t y fr o m GNP ( and G N P/ P)  t o publ i c
expendi t ure.
Si ngh and Sahni  (1984:  630) argue t hat  the relati onshi p bet w een publ i c expendi t ure
and nat i onal  i ncom e has been t r eated dif f erentl y i n t wo  ma j or areas of econom i c
analysi s.    Wh i l e publ i c f i nance studi es have generall y post ul ated t hat   grow t h i n publ i c
expendi t ure is caused by grow t h i n nat i onal  i ncom e (W agneri an approach),  mo s t
m acroeconom et r i c m odel s have t ended t o t ake the vi ew  that  i ncom e grow t h i s
det ermi ned,  in part ,  by grow t h i n publ i c expendi t ure (K eynesi an approach).   These
di f f erent  vi ew s of  t he causal  r elati on bet w een t he t wo   vari ables,  i n t urn,   r est  on mo r e
basi c dif f erences in assum pti ons.   Publ i c fi nance st udi es, fol l ow i ng W agner,  have
consi dered publ i c expendi t ure as a behavi oural  vari able,  simi l ar  t o  pri vat e consum pt i on
expendi t ure.  B y contr ast,  m acroeconom et r i c m odel s, essenti all y fol l ow i ng K eynes,
have  t r eated publ i c expendi t ure as an exogenous  pol i cy i nst r um ent   desi gned  t o  corr ect
short - t erm  cycli cal  f l uct uat i ons  i n  aggregate expendi t ures.
The s t andard em pi r i cal approach used to evaluat e the t wo  d i f f erent approaches has
been t o appl y causali t y t esti ng t echni ques i n t he Gr anger  ( 1969)  sense.    St udi es of  t he
di r ecti on of causali t y bet w een incom e and publ i c expendi t ure are qui t e new .  In t he
publ i c fi nance l i t erature, t he casual  l i nk bet w een publ i c expendi t ure and nat i onal
i ncom e w as fi r st exam ined by Si ngh and Sahni  (1984) and Sahni  and Si ngh (1984).
These two  p i oneeri ng st udi es, wh i ch appli ed the G ranger causali t y t est t o publ i c
expendi t ure and  nat i onal   i ncom e,   we r e each confi ned  t o  one  count r y.     They  conduct ed
causali t y t ests usi ng annual   dat a f or  Canada and I ndi a r especti vel y coveri ng a 30 year
peri od  f r om   1950  t o  1980/ 81.     Si nce t hen,   causali t y  studi es of  t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een13
publ i c expendi t ure and nat i onal  incom e grow t h have had a cent r al pl ace in m odern
publ i c expendi t ure analysi s.  G ranger causali t y t ests have been carr i ed out  for bot h
devel oped and devel opi ng count r i es w it h m i xed result s; i n sam e cases, f i ndi ng
uni di r ecti onal  causali t y fr om  expendi t ure to i ncom e (or conversely),  or fi ndi ng no
causal  r elati onshi p  or  f i ndi ng  a bi di r ecti onal   causali t y  bet w een t wo   aggregate vari ables
( e.g. ,   An s a r i   et  al  ( 1997);   Ox l ey ( 1994);   Kh a n   ( 1990);   Ra m  ( 1986);   Sahni   and Si ngh
( 1984);   Si ngh  and  Sahni   ( 1984)) .
I t   i s clear  t hat   know l edge of  t he t r ue nat ure of  t he causal  process wi l l   hel p det ermi ne
t he r obust ness of  t he esti ma t ed r elati onshi ps i n t hese studi es.    Shoul d t he causali t y be
W agneri an, t he est i ma t es deri ved fr om  m acroeconom et r i c m odel s w oul d evi dent l y
suff er fr om  si mu l t aneit y bi as.  O n the ot her hand,  if  the causali t y i s K eynesian, the
esti ma t es report ed in publ i c fi nance st udi es w oul d si mi l arl y be bi ased.  In addi t i on,
know l edge of t he precise causal process has im port ant pol i cy imp l i cati ons.   For
exam ple,  i f   t he causali t y we r e W agneri an,  publ i c expendi t ure i s r elegated t o a passive
r ol e.  In ot her wo r ds,  publ i c expendi t ure plays no rol e in econom i c grow t h,  and
t herefore cannot  be reli ed upon as a pol i cy inst r um ent .   If  K eynesi an, it  acqui r es the
status of an im port ant pol i cy vari able.  In t hi s case, publ i c expendi t ure becom es a
pol i cy vari able w hich can be used to i nfl uence econom i c grow t h.   R elyi ng on t hi s
K eynesi an hypot hesi s, m any devel opi ng count r i es, such as Turkey,  have assi gned t o
t hei r   publ i c sector  t he  r ol e of  prom ot i ng  grow t h  and  econom i c devel opm ent .
On e   of  t he cri t i ques of  t he r ol e of  t he publ i c sector  i s t hat   governm ent   i s l ess eff i cient
t han ma r ket   f orces i n all ocati ng r esources.    Mo r eover,   t he r egul atory process and,   f or
t hat  ma t t er m onet ary and fi scal pol i cies, can potenti all y di stort  the i ncenti ve system .
As   argued  by  An s a r i   et  al. ,
i t   i s not   necessary t hat   eit her  W agner’ s hypot hesi s,  wi t h causal  orderi ng f r om  nat i onal   i ncom e
t o expendi t ure, or K eynes’s hypot hesi s, wi t h causal orderi ng fr om  expendi t ure to nat i onal
i ncom e hol d t r ue.   N or,  for that  ma t t er,  are the t wo  p r oposi t i ons m ut ual l y excl usi ve.   O n the
one  hand,   i f   governm ent   obl i gat i ons  call   f or  a sm oot her  expendi t ure pat t ern  t han  t hat   wh i ch i s
possibl e given t he vari ati on i n nat i onal  incom e (f i nanced,  say, through debt  borr ow i ng),  the
causal l i nk fr om  nat i onal  i ncom e t o expendi t ure w il l  be l essened.   On t he ot her hand,
governm ent   expendi t ure can crow d out   pri vat e expendi t ure t hus r educi ng t he causal  l i nk f r om
expendi t ure to nat i onal  i ncom e.   Sort i ng out  t he causal relati onshi p bet w een governm ent
expendi t ure and nat i onal  incom e i s essenti al if  the eff ecti veness of publ i c expendi t ure as a
pol i cy i nst r um ent   f or  econom i c devel opm ent   i s t o  be  assessed ( An s a r i   et  al. ,   1997:   544).
Wh e t her  changes i n  nat i onal   i ncom e  grow t h  hel p  predict  changes i n  publ i c expendi t ure
grow t h (and/ or vi ce versa) rem ains an i m port ant issue of sustained i nt erest in t he
em pir i cal  publ i c f i nance l i t erature.    I n r ecent  years,  att enti on has been ma i nl y confi ned
t o t wo   specif i c areas,  nam el y,   esti ma t i on of  t he i m pact  of  t he publ i c sector  on out put
grow t h (by m eans of regression analysi s) and causali t y t esti ng.   U nfort unat ely,  the14
out com e of bot h t ypes of analysi s has been inconcl usi ve (Ah s a n  e t  al. ,  1992).   M ore
r ecentl y,  coint egrati on st udi es have st art ed to appear i n t he l i t erature as a new
devel opm ent   i n  t i me   seri es analysi s.
Ca us a l i t y st udi es based on W agner’ s reasoning i s hypot hesi sed to run fr o m GNP
( and/ or  GNP/ P)   t o  t he  dependent   vari able wh i ch t akes f our  di f f erent  f orms :   E,   C,   E/ P,
E/ GNP.   W e also look at  the K eynesi an approach w hich assum es that  causali t y i s
hypot hesi sed to run fr om  publ i c expendi t ure to  GNP.   W agner’ s L aw  requi r es that
publ i c expendi t ure does not  cause G N P, because of t hat  i t  i s necessary t o appl y
bi vari ate causali t y  t esti ng.
4. 2. 1 G ranger Ca us a l i t y  Te s t
Al t hough  t here i s som e evidence  t hat   vari ous  m easures of  publ i c expendi t ure and  GNP
( and G N P/ P)  are nonst ati onary,  and noncoi nt egrated, it  is sti l l  possibl e to appl y t he
Gr anger  causali t y t est,   usi ng I ( 0)  seri es.    I n ot her  wo r ds,   we   can use changes i n GNP
and  publ i c expendi t ure i n  order  t o  appl y  Gr anger  causali t y  t est.
I n subsect i on 4. 2,   f or  each version of  W agner’ s Law,   t he ADF  stati sti c cannot   r eject
t he nul l   hypot hesi s of  no coint egrati on and t hi s concl usi on l eads us t o say t hat   a l ong-
r un equi l i bri um  r elati onshi p bet w een publ i c expendi t ure and GNP  f or  Tur key over  t he
study peri od does not  exist.   In t he absence of a long-r un relati onshi p bet w een the
vari ables, it  sti l l  rem ains of int erest to exam ine t he short - r un l i nkages bet w een them
( M anni ng and A dri acanos, 1993;  Ge mme l l ,  1990).   Ho we v e r ,  wi t hout  evidence of
coint egrati on an err or- corr ecti on procedure cannot  be used t o m odel  short - r un
r elati onshi p bet w een nati onal  incom e and publ i c expendi t ure (An s a r i  et al. ,  1997).
Ho we v e r ,  it  ma y  s t i l l  be possi bl e to m odel  short - r un behavi our of the relati onshi p
bet w een   nat i onal   i ncom e and publ i c expendi t ure appl yi ng t he Gr anger  causali t y t est.
That   i s,  even t hough a l ong-r un r elati onshi p bet w een t he t wo   m acro vari ables cannot
be  establi shed f or  t hi s t i me   peri od,   i t   ma y   sti l l   be  possibl e t hat   t he  vari ables are causall y
r elated i n  t he  short - r un.
I n econom i cs, system ati c testi ng and det ermi nat i on of causal di r ecti ons onl y becam e
possibl e aft er an operati onal  fr am ew ork w as devel oped by G ranger (1969) and Si ms
( 1972).     Thei r   approach i s cruci all y based on t he axiom  t hat   t he past   and present  ma y
cause t he  f ut ure but   t he  f ut ure cannot   cause t he  past   ( Gr anger,   1980).
I n  econom et r i cs t he  mo s t   wi del y  used  operati onal   defi ni t i on  of  causali t y  i s t he  Gr anger
defi ni t i on  of  causali t y,   wh i ch i s defi ned  as f ol l ow s:15
x  i s a Gr anger  cause of  y  ( denot ed as x →  y) ,   i f   present  y can be predicted wi t h bet t er  accuracy
by usi ng past  val ues of x rather t han by not  doi ng so,  ot her i nforma t i on bei ng i dent i cal
( Cha r em za and  D eadm an,  1992: 190).
I f   event  A  happens aft er  event  B,   i t   i s assum ed t hat   A  cannot   have caused B.     At   t he
sam e t i me ,   i f   A  happens before B,   i t   does not   necessari l y m ean t hat   A  causes B.     For
exam ple,  t he  w eatherma n ’ s predicti on  occurs before t he  r ain.     Thi s does  not   m ean t hat
t he w eatherma n   causes t he r ain.     I n practi ce,  we   observe A  and B  as t i me   seri es and
we   w oul d  l i ke  t o  know   wh e t her  A  precedes B,   or  B  precedes A.
I n  t he  l i t erature,  t here are vari ous  t ests f or  det ermi ni ng  Gr anger  causali t y  i n  a bi vari ate
system .  A m ong t hem ,  Gu i l key and Sal em i (1982) and G ew eke-M eese-De n t  (1983)
r ecom m end t he use of  t he ordi nary l east  squares version of  t he Gr anger  t est,   because
of  i t s ease of  i mp l em entati on,   pow er,   and  r obust ness i n  f i ni t e sam ples.
Ther e are a num ber  of  causali t y studi es i n t he f i eld of  publ i c expendi t ure.    Ho we v e r ,
very few  of t hem  (e.g.  He n r ekson (1992);  Af xent i ou and Serl eti s (1992);  Mu r t hy
( 1993);   Ox l ey ( 1994);   An s a r i   et  al.   ( 1997))   have  checked f or  t he  t i me   seri es propert i es
and especiall y coi nt egrati ng propert i es of t he t i me  s e r i es invol ved.   A s Bahm ani -
O skooee and Al se ( 1993:   536)  poi nt ed out ,   “Standard Gr anger  or  Si ms   t ests are onl y
val i d i f  t he ori gi nal  t i me  s e r i es fr om  w hi ch grow t h rates are generated are not
coint egrated”.    Ther efore,  i t   i s necessary t o check f or  t he coint egrati ng propert i es of
t he publ i c expendi t ure and GNP  before usi ng t he simp l e Gr anger  t est.     Si nce we   have
appl i ed coint egrati on t ests earl i er (see Table 3) and have found no evi dence of a
coint egrati ng r elati onshi p i n any of  t he equat i ons,   i t   i s now  possibl e t o appl y causali t y
t esti ng.
I f  the nul l  hypot hesi s of noncoi nt egrati on bet w een Y t  (publ i c expendi t ure) and X t
( GNP  or  GNP/ P)   cannot   be r ejected,  t hen t he standard Gr anger  causali t y t est  can be
em ployed t o exam ine t he causal  r elati onshi p bet w een t he seri es ( usi ng t he vari ables i n
f i r st di f f erences) (M ahdavi  et al. ,  1994).   Foll ow i ng t hi s statem ent w e can test the
hypot hesi s that  GNP g r ow t h,  l abell ed (∆ LX) ,  causes publ i c expendi t ure grow t h,
l abell ed (∆ LY) ,   and  vi ce versa,  by  const r uct i ng  t he  f ol l ow i ng  causal  m odel s:
∆ LY t = a +  b  i∆ 
i= 1
m
∑  LY t− i+  d  i∆ L
i= 1
n
∑  X t− i + et ( 4)
∆ LX t = a +  bj∆ 
j= 1
q
∑  LX t− j +  cj∆ 
j= 1
r
∑  LY t− j + vt ( 5)16
wh e r e et and vt  are tw o uncorr elated w hit e-noi se seri es and m , n and q,  r are the
ma x i m um  num ber of l ags.  It  i s w ell  know n t hat  t he causali t y l i t erature assum es
stati onari t y of the t i me  s e r i es being exam ined.   In subsect i on 4. 2,  we  f ound t hat  the
vari ables we r e are non stati onary i n l evels,  but   stati onary i n f i r st  di f f erences.    B ecause
of that  we  wi l l  appl y G ranger causali t y usi ng t he vari ables in fi r st di f f erences of the
l ogari t hm s of  t he vari ables wh i ch are stati onary ( i . e.  I ( 0)) .     On e   can use t he standard
F- t est i n order t o det ermi ne t he causal r elati onshi p bet w een the vari ables.
I nt erchanging t he causal  and t he dependent   vari ables i n t he r egression equat i on all ow s
a t est  f or  bi - di r ecti onal   causali t y.
Four fi ndi ngs are possibl e in a G ranger causali t y t est:  (i )  nei t her vari able “G ranger
causes” t he ot her.     I n  ot her  wo r ds,   i ndependence i s suggest ed t hat   wh e n   t he sets of  X
and  Y  coeff i cients are not   stati sti call y  signi f i cant  i n  bot h  r egressions  ;   ( i i )   uni di r ecti onal
causali t y f r om  X  t o Y:     That   i s,  X  causes Y,   but   not   vi ce versa ( i n t hi s case W agner’ s
Law  appl i es);   ( i i i )   uni di r ecti onal   causali t y f r om  Y  t o X:     That   i s,  Y  causes X,   but   not
vi ce versa ( K eynesi an m odel l i ng i s val i d i n t hat   case);   ( i v)  X  and Y  “G ranger  cause”
each ot her  .   I f   ( i v)  i s f ound  t o  be  t r ue,   t here i s a f eedback eff ect  ( or  bi l ateral  causali t y)
bet w een two  v a r i ables (Mi l l er and Russek (1990);  Gu j arati  (1995)) .   So neit her the
K eynesi an or  W agneri an approach i s val i d.     A ccordi ng t o t he above equat i ons ( 4 and
5),   t he nul l   hypot hesi s t hat   X  does not   Gr anger  Ca us e   Y  i s r ejected i f   t he coeff i cients
of d  is i n equat i on 4 are j oi nt l y signi f i cant  ( i . e.  d  i ≠ 0) ,   based on t he standard F- t est.
The  nul l   hypot hesi s t hat   Y  does not   Gr anger  cause X  i s r ejected i f   t he cjs are j oi nt l y
signi f i cant  ( i . e.  cj ≠ 0)   i n  equat i on  5.     A nd  i f   bot h  som e d  i ≠ 0,   and  som e cj ≠ 0    t hen
t here i s f eedback bet w een Y  and  X.
4. 2. 2E m p i rical  Re s ul t s of  G ranger  Ca us a l i t y  Te s t s
The  Gr anger  causali t y  t est  r esult s are presented i n  Tabl e 4.     The  r esult s i ncl ude  t he  six
versions  of  W agner’ s Law  wh i ch are i n  presented i n  Tabl e 4.
I n t he t ests,  causali t y i s hypot hesi sed t o r un f r om  GNP  ( or  GNP/ P)   t o t he dependent
vari able, wh i ch takes four di f f erent forms ;  E,  C,  E/ GNP,  E/ P.   In ot her wo r ds,  the
hypot hesi s t hat   GNP  causes Publ i c expendi t ure r equi r es t hat   Publ i c Expendi t ure does
not   cause GNP.     The  t ests are carr i ed out   usi ng  t he  f i r st  di f f erences of  each seri es ( i . e.,
t he  stati onary  val ues).
The di f f i cult y i n fi t t i ng m odel s 4 and 5.  revol ves around det ermi ni ng t he appropri ate
l ag l engt hs ( i . e.  m,   and n i n equat i on 4;   q and r   i n equat i on 5).     I n t he l i t erature bot h
l ags are f r equent l y chosen t o have t he sam e val ue,   and l ag l engt hs of  1,   2,   3 and 4 are
usual l y used.   T here are several cri t eri a to det ermi ne “opt i mu m”  l ag lengt hs,  such as17
Ak a i ke’s Informa t i on cri t eri on,  Ak a i ke’s FPE,  and t he Schw arz cri t eri on.   Foll ow i ng
Af xent i ou and Serl eti s (1992),  w e have chosen four di f f erent com m onl y chosen l ag
l engt hs  -   1,   2  , 3,   and  4  l ags.
The  nul l   hypot hesi s of  noncausal i t y i s t ested usi ng F- stati sti cs.    The  r esult s of  F- t ests
are presented i n Tabl e 4.     The  r esult s i n Tabl e 4 i ndi cate t hat   t here i s no evidence t o
support   eit her  W agner’ s Law  i n  any  of  i t s versions  or  K eynesi an hypot hesi s.
Tabl e 4T h e   Re s ul t s of  Gr anger  Ca us a l i t y  t ests on  t he  Si x  Ve r sions  of  W agner' s Law
Ve r sion  of F  Va l ues
W agner' s Law Nul l   H ypot hesi s1   Lag 2  Lag 3  Lag 4  Lag
1 ∆ LGNP  does  not   cause ∆ LE 0. 58 0. 29 0. 52
∆ LE  does  not   cause ∆ LGNP 0 . 02 0. 04 1. 54
∆ LGNP  does  not   cause ∆ LC 0. 59 0. 44 0. 29 0. 57
∆ LC  does  not   cause ∆ LGNP 0 . 02 0. 002 0. 09 1. 26
3 ∆∆ LE 0. 37 0. 26
∆ LE  does  not   cause ∆ L( GNP/ P) 0. 027 0. 06 0. 14 1. 61
4 ∆ L( GNP/ P)   does  not   cause ∆ L( E/ GNP) 0 . 09 0. 13 0. 23 0. 31
∆∆ L( GNP/ P) 0. 05 0. 13
5 ∆ L( GNP/ P)   does  not   cause ∆ 0. 50 0. 37 0. 52
∆ L( E/ P)   does  not   cause ∆ 0. 02 0. 05 1. 60
6 ∆ LGNP  does  not   cause ∆ L( E/ GNP) 0 . 08 0. 23 0. 30
∆ L( E/ GNP)   does  not   cause ∆ LGNP 0 . 02 0. 04 1. 54
and  4  l ag cases r especti vel y.     The  r elated F- cri t i cal  val ues  at  5%   signi f i cance l evel  are ( 4. 11),   ( 3. 30),   ( 2. 92)  and
( 2. 73)  r especti vel y.
As  An s a r i  et al.  (1997:  549) argued,  “[m] any factors can of course lessen the causal
r elati onshi p bet w een the t w o m acro vari ables, t he l east of wh i ch is the form o f
l i t t l e, but  expendi t ure on healt h,  educati on,  roads,  bri dges and port  facil i t i es can do
mu c h   t o encourage grow t h and devel opm ent   i n t he econom y.     Ho we v e r ,   governm ent
expendi t ure on  ot her  i nvest me n t s”.18
I n t esti ng for causali t y,  the l ags w ere chosen in advance,  that  is, arbi t r ari l y.   Even
t hough t hi s procedure is com m onl y appl i ed in em pi r i cal studi es, t here are som e
cri t i cism s about  t hi s w ay of choosi ng l ag lengt h.   A rbi t r ary l ag specif i cati ons can
produce  mi sleading  r esult s,  and  so we   mu s t   t r eat  t he  r esult s wi t h  cauti on.     That   i s,  t he
Gr anger causali t y t est is very sensi t i ve t o t he num ber of lags used in t he analysi s.
Consi deri ng  t hi s poi nt ,   i n  order  t o  det ermi ne  t he  appropri ate l ag str uct ure,  one  can use
one  of  t he  appropri ate l ag l engt h  cri t eri a such as Schwar z’s cri t eri on.     We   have  l ooked
at  AI C  as we l l .     Mo s t   of  t he  cases,    one  l ag wa s   chosen  by  AI C.     Ho we v e r ,   t he  r esult s
we r e not   changed  at  all .
The  concl usi on t hat   we   have r eached,  based on t he econom et r i c me t hod and dat a set
used,  i s that  t here is no evi dence t o support  eit her W agner’ s L aw  or K eynes’s
hypot hesi s.
5C o n c l usi on
I n t hi s paper,  W agner' s  La w wa s  t ested using aggregate Turki sh data for the peri od
1950-1990.     We   l ooked at  t he t i me   seri es propert i es of  t he dat a,  i . e.  we   t ested f or  t he
existence of  uni t   r oot s.    We   f ound  t hat   bot h  t he  publ i c expendi t ure and  GNP  vari ables
we r e nonst ati onary i n l evels, but  stati onary i n fi r st di f f erences, t hat  i s, t hey are
i nt egrated of  order  one  ( I ( 1)) .     Si nce we   use  singl e equat i on  m odel ( s),   we   have  appl i ed
a coint egrati on t est (t he fi r st stage of Engl e and G ranger' s two  s t age residual  based
approach)  t o six versions of  W agner' s Law.     A ccordi ng t o t he t est  r esult s,  t here i s no
coint egrati ng relati onshi p bet w een the vari ables.  I ncl udi ng t i me  t r ends i nt o
coint egrati on r egressions di d not   change t he r esult s eit her.     These f i ndi ngs show  t hat
t he support   of  W agner' s Law  f ound by m any earl y r esearchers ma y   be spuri ous.     I n a
t est  on Tur ki sh dat a we   cannot   f i nd any l ong-r un posi t i ve r elati onshi p bet w een publ i c
expendi t ure and GNP  vari ables f or  any of  t he six versions of  W agner’ s Law  l i sted i n
Tabl e 1.
Al t hough  t here i s som e evidence  t hat   vari ous  m easures of  publ i c expendi t ure and  GNP
( and GNPPC)   are nonst ati onary,   and not   coint egrated i n t hi s study,   i t   i s sti l l   possibl e
t o appl y t he Gr anger  causali t y t est,   usi ng I ( 0)  seri es ( i . e.  f i r st  di f f erences i n our  case).
I n t he absence of  a l ong-r un r elati onshi p bet w een vari ables,  i t   sti l l   r em ains of  i nt erest
t o exam ine t he short - r un l i nkages bet w een them .   W e have carr i ed out  Gr anger
causali t y  t ests f or  t he  six  versions  of  W agner’ s Law.     Ho we v e r ,   t here i s no  evidence  t o
support   eit her  W agner’ s Law  i n  any  of  i t s versions  or  K eynes'   hypot hesi s.
I n t he l i ght   of  t he r eport ed em pir i cal  r esult s i n t hi s paper,   one ma y   t entati vel y suggest
t hat   t he grow t h of  publ i c expendi t ure i n t he case of  Tur key i s not   di r ectl y dependent19
on and det ermi ned by econom i c grow t h as W agner’ s law  states.  O f course, publ i c
expendi t ure is the out com e of m any deci sions i n t he l i ght  of changing econom i c
cir cum stances.  It  is shaped by decisions about  how  publ i c expendi t ure shoul d be
di str i but ed am ong com pet i ng groups,  wh e t her geographi call y concent r ated or
aggregated i n organi sed i nt erests ( Kl ein,   1976).     Thus,   ot her  f actors,  such as pol i t i cal
processes, int erest group behavi our and t he nat ure of Tur ki sh devel opm ent  m ay be
consi dered as possibl e explanatory vari ables for t he i ncrease in t he si ze of publ i c
expendi t ure.  In t hi s cont ext,  w e shoul d rem em ber the i m port ance of state econom i c
enterpri ses, wh i ch w e did not  i ncl ude i n our publ i c expendi t ure defi ni t i on.   For
exam ple,  Ya l çin ( 1987)  has f ound evidence f or  W agner’ s Law  aft er  i ncl udi ng SEEs   i n
t he  publ i c expendi t ure defi ni t i on.
I n t hi s paper,   we   f ail ed t o f i nd any evidence f or  W agner’ s Law  usi ng aggregate dat a.
Ho we v e r ,  i t  i s possibl e to exam ine di saggregated data to i nvest i gat e publ i c
expendi t ure grow t h i n Turkey i n t erms  o f  W agner’ s L aw .  In our fut ure study,  we
i nt end t o exam ine t he rol e of di saggregated data in expl aini ng publ i c expendi t ure
grow t h  i n  Tur key.20
Appendi x  2:  Da t a  and  The i r Sources
E/ GNP= t he  r ati o  of  t ot al  publ i c expendi t ure t o  GNP  ( No t e t hat   dependent   vari able
i s expressed as a percentage share of  GNP) .     Tot al  publ i c expendi t ure ( E)
i ncl udes i nvest me n t  and t r ansfers (and EBFs aft er 1984) are taken fr om
Ö nder (1984),  Ön e r  (1993),  SPO ( 1985) and O ECD  (1992;  Econom i c
Surveys ) ;   GNP  i s t aken f r om   SI S  ( 1993).
C R eal Publ i c Consum pt i on Expendi t ures.  Pryor (1969) used t hi s term.
They cover t he curr ent expendi t ures for goods and servi ces and the
t r ansfer  paym ent s by  governm ent s.
GRNPPC=t he real GNP p e r  capit a (GNP p e r  capit a convert ed by G N P defl ator
( 1968=100)) ,
P Popul ati on  i s t aken f r om   SI S  ( 1993).
GNPD= d e f l ator  f or  GNP  ( 1968=100)  i s t aken f r om   SI S  ( 1993).21
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